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The Chinese state is essentially the 
Chinese Communist Party. Giv-
en the colossal size of the coun-
try and the economy, the transi-
tion, liberalisation and reforms 
underway since 1978, it is not easy 
to ascertain the extent to which 
the state (CCP) keeps its finger 
on the pulse of the economy and 
society. This is partly due to in-
consistencies in statistical proce-
dures. For example, the fact that 
the Chinese Federation of Indus-
try and Commerce (ACFIC) de-
fines ‘private’ mining companies 
(which account for the majority 
of mining corporations) as ones 
in which there is no public share-
holding. This means that they in-
clude cooperatives as well. However, according to 
data from the National Statistics Office the ‘public 
sector’ covers both state and cooperatively (collec-
tively) owned enterprises.1 
Company reform was introduced in the middle 
of the 1990s and was approved by the Congress of 
the CCP in 1997. This reform rested on two pillars. 
The first permitted state-owned companies to be-
come joint-stock companies, sell their shares and 
establish other joint-stock companies. This is when 
the company forms were established that were con-
tained in the 1994 Decree on the State Council. The 
second pillar was the so-called 
‘zhuada fangxiao’ strategy (‘keep 
the big one, let the small one go’), 
which revolved around develop-
ing and strongly supporting a few 
large state conglomerates whilst 
leaving the small ones ‘to their 
own devices’. 
As part of the reform the de-
cree issued by the State Council 
in 1994 enabled the following 5 
types of companies to be regis-
tered at the central or local gov-
ernment authorities: joint-stock 
companies; enterprises estab-
lished with investment approved 
by the State Council (companies); 
limited liability companies estab-
lished fully or partially by invest-
ment organisations authorised by 
the State Council (limited liabil-
ity companies); limited liability 
companies established by foreign 
investors; other companies regis-
tered by the State Council for In-
dustry and Trade (other companies).
Furthermore, the Chinese statistical office lists sev-
eral types of business unit and enterprise forms, but 
private enterprises are listed separately. (Table 1) 
The statistical office testified to 44.7 million busi-
ness units in 2008. (Table 2) According to the report 
the number of corporations has risen 52.6% (to al-
most 5 million) since 2004. The number of public-
sector companies and cooperatives has dropped 
sharply (mostly due to mergers and the ‘zhuada 
fangxiao’ policy, while the number of private com-
panies is on the rise. 72.5% of all businesses were in 
private hands. In addition there 
were 15.96 million ‘legal units’ 
or ‘establishments’, 28.7 million 
self-employed units with licenc-
es (i.e. sole traders, micro enter-
prises), 102,000 foreign business 
A N NA m á r I A A rT N er
Public or Private?
rOle OF THe STATe AND SmeS IN CHINA
China is considered as a ‘mixed 
economy’ or ‘market socialism’ in 
mainstream economics. The de-
velopment path of this now global 
player in Asia along with the how’s 
and why’s are particularly interest-
ing now at a time when capitalism 
is undergoing another large-scale 
crisis. What controls China: mar-
ket mechanisms, communist ide-
als, or pragmatism that flouts these 
dilemmas and follows its own de-
velopment objectives? As Deng Xi-
aoping said: it doesn’t matter if the 
cat is black or white – so long as it 
catches the mouse. 
Jel l-53
Annamária Artner  
CSc, senior research fellow 
(Institute for World Economics 
of the Hungarian Economy of 
Sciences)
73
A n n A m á r i A  A r t n e r :  P u b l i c  o r  P r i v A t e ?   2 0 1 0 / 3  ( 7 2 – 7 9 )
units and 84,000 set up by funds from Hong Kong, 
macau and Taiwan. Of course, the number of com-
panies and various business units obviously does 
not reflect their economic significance since the 
various types of state, cooperative and collective 
companies are generally much larger than private 
businesses. 
D e c l i n i n G  i n F l u e n c e  o F  P u b l i c 
S e c t o r ?
Only in 2005 did the Chinese government give the 
private sector the same rights as public companies 
as regards entering markets, project access, taxation, 
land use, foreign trade, etc.2 However, the impor-
tance of the private sector is growing rapidly − which 
is not thanks to foreign capital but to state policy 
(successful battle against poverty, easier access to 
credits, facilitating effect of state investments, etc.) 
and to domestic savings. Day by day an increasing 
number of companies generate annual sales revenue 
of more than CNY 5 million, and thus become part 
of the statistics. Venture capitalists start to show an 
interest from 100 million yuan.
Due to the series of market reforms there is a 
growing impression that the private sector is slow-
ly taking over the lead role in the Chinese econo-
my. But is that really the case?
According to calculations of li Chengshui, former 
head of the Chinese Statistical Office, published in 
October 2006 the public sector accounts for just 32% 
of industry and services employment and only 37% 
of GDP. This constitutes a sharp decline on 1995, 
when the state made up 78% of GDP. endeavouring 
to eliminate overlaps in the statistics, li concluded 
that between 1995 and 2005 the number of private 
firms increased 6½ fold (from 660,000 to 4.3 mil-
lion), while the numbers they employed rose more 
than 5½ fold (from 8.2 million to 47.1 million). At 
the same time their total capital rose 26-fold, reach-
ing CNY 6,133.1 billion (roughly USD 830 billion). 
In 2000 private capital accounted for 55% of GDP 
(of which 42.4 percentage points came from Chi-
nese mining companies and 12.6 percentage points 
from foreign capital). In 2005, however, it totalled 
65% (50 and 16 percentage points from Chinese pri-
vate mining companies and foreign capital respec-
tively).3 According to other calculations the weight 
of private capital in GDP amounted to 63% in 2006. 
Here we should note that the classification of mining 
cooperatives is distorting because they are assigned 
to the private sector in statistics, though the coop-
erative is a form of public ownership. And as we see, 
mining plays an extremely important role as part of 
the ‘private’ sector. This factor must be taken into 
account when evaluating the following data.
According to the calculations of statistician li, 
registered capital in 2001 was split between the pub-
lic and private sectors in a 2/3 : 1/3 ratio, but by 2004 
this had changed to 56:44. And the significance of 
the private sector has continued to grow since. 
The decline of the public sector has been noted 
by4 as well: 49.6% of industrial output in 1998 came 
from companies fully or partially owned by the state, 
a figure that had fallen to 38% by 2004. In 2004, cen-
tral government employed 23.7% of the total head-
count at state-controlled companies, but held 48% 
of their total equity. 
Table 1
Number of corporations according  
to registration
Corpo-
rations 
(10.000)
Percent 
(%)
Total 459.9 100.0
Domestic 477.4 96.3
  State-owned 14.3 2.9
  Collective-owned 19.2 3.9
  Share-holding Cooperatives 6.4 1.3
    Joint Ownership 1.1 0.2
    State Joint Ownership 0.2 0.0
    Collective Joint Ownership 0.4 0.1
    Joint State-Collective 0.2 0.0
    Other Joint Ownership 0.3 0.1
  limited liability Corporations 55.1 11.1
    State Sole Funded 1.1 0.2
    Other limited liability Corp. 54.1 10.9
  Share-holding Corporations ltd. 9.7 2.0
  Private 359.6 72.5
  Other Domestic Corporations 11.9 2.4
Corporations with Funds from Hong 
Kong, macao and Taiwan
8.4 1.7
Foreign Funded Corporations 10.2 2.0
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://
www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/
t20091225_402610168.htm 
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Based on data from the Chinese Statistical Of-
fice,5 notes that private companies employ 70 mil-
lion people, which represents 80% of the total in-
dustrial employment. Private enterprises account 
for 70% of industrial profits and in 2008 their prof-
its grew twice as fast (by 31.4%) as state-run com-
panies. The private sector (including the small-
est enterprises) is making progress not only in in-
dustry but also in services. Finance, however, re-
mains in the hands of state-owned banks and in-
surers, and the public sector also dominates utili-
ties and transport. 
Although members of the communist party 
have only allowed to be stockholders from 2002, 
they accounted for 13% of party members in 1993, 
while a national survey suggested they totalled al-
most 30% in 2001. And in 2005 (according to data 
from the Chinese Federation of Industry and Com-
merce, ACFIC) 33.9% of party members were ‘cap-
italist employers’. A good number of the 100 rich-
est Chinese people are party members, and accord-
ing to li’s calculations more than three quarters of 
the communist party members became capitalists 
after joining the party.6 
The ground lost by Chinese state companies is 
particularly evident in industry: between 1997 and 
2004 their share dropped from 25.5% to 15.3%. Pri-
vate capital is conquering an increasing number of 
areas in strategic industries too (energy supply, rail-
way, postal and telecommunications services, de-
fence industry, etc.). Agriculture accounts for 15% 
of GDP but this is still where 46-47% of employment 
is found. The ratio of state-owned farms is negligi-
ble, totalling a mere 5%, and they employ less than 
1% of those working in agriculture. The number of 
state-owned farms is on the decline as well, total-
ling 1968 in 2004. The de-collectivisation (marketi-
sation) of agriculture has been underway since the 
end of the 1970s, but this has not been accepted eve-
rywhere throughout the country. According to li, 
‘many thousands’ of villages are still growing pro-
duce on a collective basis. In recent years various 
public-sector measures have been deployed to sup-
port collectives, but despite this there are still no 
official statistics on them, which makes it impossi-
ble to know how many there are. 
Naughton7 notes that in spite of the progress made 
by private capital the state still controls the key po-
sitions in the economy. This is because the econo-
my is dominated by companies generating sales rev-
enue of more than CNY 5 million (USD 600,000), 
and smaller firms account for only 23% of industrial 
output (2004 figures). In 2003 they established the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission (SASAC), followed by provincial 
sub-committees. This organisation is designed to 
deploy strong control mechanisms over the massive 
state-run companies fostered by the ‘zhuada fangx-
iao’ policy. There are 196 large corporations under 
the SASAC wing, which as colossal conglomerates 
control hundreds of smaller companies and mas-
sive amounts of money. even SASAC has difficulty 
in exerting any influence on them.8 
The influence of the public (collective) sector is 
greater than the direct economic weighting of state-
controlled companies. many companies that are 
formally considered to be in private hands have ex-
tremely close links to the public sector, and are more 
intertwined than one would see in capitalist coun-
tries. This is why the profitability of private compa-
nies is largely thanks to the public sector.
Consequently, what we have here is a very much 
centralised corporate structure where smaller com-
panies play a key role in employment but the main 
strategic role is played by state-run companies, which 
therefore includes capital exports too. 
It is not easy to determine the exact ratios of pub-
lic and private capital in Chinese capital exports 
Table 2
Units and self-employed individuals with licenses
Units 
(10,000)
Percent 
(%)
I. legal Units 709.9 100.0
    Corporations 495.9 69.9
    Departments and institutions 95.9 13.5
    Social groups and other legal 
Units
118.1 16.6
II. establishments 886.4 100.0
    manufacturing 230.0 25.9
    Services 656.4 74.1
III. Self-employed individuals 2873.7 100.0
    manufacturing 253.8 8.8
    Services 2619.9 91.2
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. http://
www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/
t20091225_402610168.htm 
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since the various forms of companies, the uncer-
tainties surrounding their ownership structures and 
the lack of official data make this impossible. How-
ever, the following data reveals that the private sec-
tor is currently playing catch-up to the public sec-
tor in this context.
The large investments are obviously carried out by 
state-run companies but generally it is these firms 
that have sufficient funding. (There are of course 
some exceptions, such as the financial firm Ping An 
mentioned earlier.) estimates suggest that state en-
terprises falling under the protective arm of central 
government accounted for 73.5% of outbound FDI 
in 2003 and 82-83% in 2004-2005. The remaining 
one-fifth or so came from regional companies, col-
lective production units and private firms. 
Just how difficult it is to work out the owner-
ship structure behind capital exports is shown by 
the following two press releases that are based on 
data from ministries. According to a press release 
from the Chinese news agency dated 8 September 
2009, a total of 50.2% of Chinese companies invest-
ing abroad in 2008 were limited liability companies, 
16.1% were state companies (which represents a de-
cline of 3.6 percentage points compared to the pre-
vious year) and only 9.4% were private firms. There 
is no information available on the remaining 20% 
or so.9 A good week later, Xinhua quoted the min-
istry of Commerce and reported that of the 136 
state-controlled enterprises in 2008, a total of 117 
invested USD 35.74 billion abroad, which equalled 
64% of the total capital exports in that year. At the 
end of 2008, state-run companies employed a total 
of 597,300 people at their foreign places of business 
(which is 58% of the total Chinese foreign employ-
ment), 40% of whom were locals.10 
This indicates a dominance of public capital, the 
limited liability companies are typically in state or 
local government hands, or are (joint) ventures in 
some form of collective ownership. (What is also 
important is that in joint ventures the state still calls 
the shots, even with a minority shareholding.) The 
press releases do not cover capital exports over and 
above the investments made by public and private 
companies (64+9.4=73.4%). Such exports are prob-
ably accounted for by financial investments, but 
here the ownership structure is unknown. None-
theless, based on information to date it is likely that 
the state dominance here is similar, or even higher. 
The dominant role of the Chinese state is also illus-
trated by the state capital fund. The CIC (Chinese 
Investment Corporation) established in 2007 held 
US securities worth USD 9.63 billion at the end of 
2009. Accordingly one could venture that roughly 
two-thirds of total Chinese capital exports is driv-
en by the state, i.e. private capital accounts for ap-
proximately one-third. 
The ratio of ‘purely’ capitalist firms (private share-
holders) in the spread of Chinese production capital 
is therefore rising, but the dominance of the state 
remains. The concerns about Chinese investments 
and the obstacles placed in their way are fuelled by 
this very fact. To a certain extent this explains why 
Chinese managers prefer to avoid the more pro-
tected and regulated european and North Ameri-
can markets, where they encounter too many prob-
lems and find it difficult to find their bearings, and 
instead focus on non-western type markets in Af-
rica and Asia, which are protected with relatively 
weak institutions and are generally characterised 
with a high level of state intervention.11 
D Y n A m i c  D e v e l o P m e n t  o F  S m e S
Defining the Chinese small and medium-sized 
business sector is no less difficult then establish-
ing the general ownership structure of the Chi-
nese economy. 
According to the Chinese system, a small com-
pany is one that employs up to 300 people, a medi-
um-sized company employs 301-2000 people, gen-
erates sales revenue of no more than CNY 300 mil-
lion (roughly USD 44 million), and has assets of 
no more than CNY 400 million (thus compared to 
Sme standards in europe these companies can be 
8 times as large). These companies account for 99% 
of all the companies in China and they are rapidly 
growing in number from year to year. Yet it is diffi-
cult to pinpoint just how many there are. The mas-
sive differences are presumably derived from wheth-
er companies with a few employees are included or 
not, along with the self-employed. (The statistical 
office for example includes companies with less than 
8 staff, while other state bodies do not)
In 2001 the Chinese authorities revealed there 
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were 8 million Smes,12 but on the government’s of-
ficial website in December 2009 the number of 4.3 
million was recorded, while in 2006 the Chinese sta-
tistical office reported a figure of 39 million. Accord-
ing to the China Daily there are currently 42 million 
Smes in China, while the US investment firm Wit-
ter puts the number at around 60 million.13
The most recent data comes from the 2008 sur-
vey of the Chinese statistical office. This reveals that 
there are 28.7 million ‘self-employed’ and a further 
16 million production units (including almost 5 mil-
lion ‘corporations’), i.e. a total of 44.7 million busi-
ness entities in China. We do not know the exact 
number of Smes from this, but if we subtract the 
number of ‘corporations’ we arrive at the figure of 
39.7 million, which is essentially the same as the es-
timate given by the NBSC for Smes in 2006.
What is remarkable is that the roughly 40 self-
employed businesses and small and medium-sized 
enterprises were mostly established in the last 10 
years. This represents unprecedented growth if we 
consider that the number of Smes in the USA and 
europe combined (including the self-employed) is 
about 35 million.
The situation is more balanced when it comes to 
the socio-economic role of Smes. Data suggests the 
GDP share of this sector is around 58-60%, their 
export share is 60-70%, while they account for 75-
80% of the new jobs and urban employment each 
year as well as 50% of tax receipts. Given the differ-
ent systems the numbers are perhaps exaggerated a 
bit – we witnessed similar distortion in Taiwan in 
the 1990s – but even if only half were true the fig-
ures are still high.14 
In the european and US capitalist-type econo-
mies, Smes are generally private companies, which 
is not the case in China. Here the majority of the 
Smes, especially the larger ones, are some kind of 
collectively-owned ‘town and village corporation’ 
(cooperative).
According to,15 CeO of the China First Capital 
private equity fund, the Chinese Sme sector is set 
to undergo rocketing growth in the coming years: 
In 2010 investments into the Chinese Sme sector 
will amount to USD 300 million, and by 2011 cap-
ital totalling USD 5 billion will be invested by the 
various equity funds; state financing will shift from 
public-sector companies to private firms, and in the 
coming 5 years the average profitability of Chinese 
Smes will exceed 40%.
For the large investment funds around the world, 
acquiring a stake in Chinese Smes appears to be a 
promising business opportunity. For example, mD 
Witter Investments llC and the New York Global 
Group have prioritised the strengthening of links 
with Chinese companies in their business strategies. 
They are targeting businesses which are already list-
ed or plan to be listed on the large global stock ex-
changes (i.e. in New York).16 
S t A t e  S u P P o r t  o F  S m e S
The majority of large corporations are state-owned, 
and so the private companies emerging as a result 
of state policy supporting private capital are obvi-
ously small at the outset. It is the responsibility of 
the state and the local governments, especially in 
times of crisis, to support their growth and techno-
logical development. There is an even greater need 
for this as this business sector principally finances 
itself from loans, and according to estimates, the 
crisis squeezing the loan markets means that 40% of 
Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises were 
forced to abandon their operations by the middle 
of 2009, and a further 40% are currently facing the 
same threat.17 Helping these enterprises was the 
purpose of the government’s loan expansion poli-
cy in early 2009. 
However, according to a Xinhua statement cit-
ing the statistical office that was posted on the Chi-
nese government website, the Sme sector could on-
ly obtain 50% of the loans. The investments of pri-
vate firms in the first 9 months of 2009 rose by ‘on-
ly’ 27.7%, while the corresponding figure for state-
run companies was 48%. This is why the govern-
ment took quick action to help Smes with prefer-
ential taxation and access to funds.18 
The difficulties facing small and medium-sized 
enterprises are largely thanks to the somewhat less 
sophisticated technologies and the lack of r+D. Of 
the roughly 40 million Chinese Smes only 160,000 
can be considered innovative companies.19 At the 
same time there is some innovation potential in 
the small and medium-sized enterprise sector, as 
demonstrated by operating results, since the lack 
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of financial strength means that these companies 
cannot convert their ideas into marketable prod-
ucts. The Chinese government is striving to rem-
edy this problem not just centrally but also at lo-
cal level.
As part of this policy a loan programme worth CNY 
33 billion (roughly USD 4.8 billion) was launched in 
the summer of 2009, where a portion was earmarked 
for developing the technologies of smaller companies. 
The tools at the disposal of the Sme department at 
the Chinese ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology stimulate the use of information tech-
nologies by Smes, and encourage them to take part 
in the state-sponsored programme to spread the use 
of household equipment in rural areas. expertise in 
the world of e-business is the best way to prepare for 
foreign sales and production too.20
Thus public monies are mainly provided for tech-
nology improvements, to help companies establish 
research centres and projects together with univer-
sities or other corporations, and relying on the co-
ordination from the ministry of Science and Tech-
nology to make the results available to other inno-
vative businesses. To this end the state set up a re-
search laboratory and technology centre specifically 
for Smes. 100,000 researchers and technicians are 
being redirected from universities and research in-
stitutions into this project.21 
State funds are also financing private equity funds 
(and venture capital) with a view to promoting in-
novative Smes. One such example is the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF) established in 2000, an 
investment fund with resources of more than USD 
146 billion; it focuses primarily on the domestic mar-
ket but now intends to invest 20% of its resources 
on emerging markets and in europe. (SWF s.a.) The 
NSSF has already financed 20 private equity funds 
(in yuan), and what is more, it is not the only cen-
tral fund involved in these endeavours.22 
One example of the local government Sme pol-
icy is Guangdong province, where there are more 
than 400,000 private companies with aggregate 
equity in excess of CNY 500 billion. The Bank Su-
pervisory Commission here has helped 23 smaller 
Chinese companies obtain a stock exchange list-
ing since 2006, facilitating the flow of CNY 8.28 
billion into these companies on the capital mar-
ket. The local government also takes action to en-
courage Smes to borrow funds: banks in the prov-
ince disbursed CNY 4 trillion to this business sec-
tor in the first half of 2009, and to encourage fur-
ther loan expansion the Bank Supervisory Com-
mission set up a loan guarantee system.23 The col-
lateral securing the loans is not necessarily real es-
tate (buildings, land) and can be intellectual prop-
erty too (patents). This makes things much easier 
for smaller businesses and is less of a threat to their 
basic operations in the future.
The Chinese Sme sector is therefore massive 
and highly differentiated. Obviously only the larg-
er Smes are really capable of investing abroad, but 
the restrictions deployed by the state up to the turn 
of the millennium restrained even their capital ex-
ports. This is because until 2002 every foreign in-
vestment worth more than USD 1 million required 
not one but two licences from state authorities. The 
situation has loosened up since, and in fact, the Chi-
nese government explicitly encourages outward cap-
ital investment by Smes. 
In view of the global economic crisis the Chi-
nese leadership launched an economic stimulus 
programme worth USD 585 billion. This sum is 
the equivalent of more than 13 percent of Chinese 
GDP in 2008. And in the first quarter of 2009 the 
state-owned banks ‘threw’ loans on to the market 
amounting to half of GDP. The larger part of this 
more than USD 1 billion sum flowed into specula-
tive areas, pushing prices up. he remainder touched 
down in the economy, stimulating the domestic mar-
ket, and so it had a relatively weak impact on capital 
exports and only supported them indirectly.
Other steps were taken to promote outward in-
vestment. In April 2009 a manual was issued to 
help domestic companies invest abroad. And in 
may the State Administration of Foreign exchange 
Control drafted a policy simplifying the procedure 
for examining and licensing investments planned 
abroad.24 
The Sme exhibition organised in Guangzhou in 
the autumn also focused on helping businesses ex-
pand abroad. The Guangdong province leadership 
strove to invite as many small and medium-sized 
enterprises to the exhibition as possible (1500) that 
were already active in other countries, in order for 
them to pass on their experience to their peers still 
producing for the domestic market alone (4500 
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such enterprises were invited). A financial section 
was opened at the exhibition and a forum was or-
ganised with the participation of banks, author-
ities and financial service providers to talk about 
the opportunities and make it easier for Smes to 
gain access to capital. 
Capital exports are traditionally supported by in-
ter-governmental ties at state level, prior to the in-
vestment. These ties ensure preferential access for 
Chinese investments in developing countries, to the 
detriment of local firms. This is what is stoking the 
fears of the Chinese ‘expansion’. It seems as if Chi-
na is slowly taking over the dreaded role from the 
USA of ‘knocking down national industries’. 
c o n c l u S i o n
The number of public Chinese companies is falling 
but they are growing in size. Private companies and 
self-employed businesses (Smes) are burgeoning, 
the added value is attracting an increasing number 
of firms to their side while the level of dependence 
on state-run companies, the public-sector ‘teat’, re-
mains, albeit in a more implicit manner. There is 
no doubt that this situation means they are almost 
‘parasites’ living on the state, while it keeps innova-
tions in check that are fuelled by the will to make 
profits. The question is what outcome this mixed 
situation will have. Will it turn capitalism loose 
on China with its massive population that still has 
many hundreds of millions of poor people, the same 
capitalism that is currently crumbling on a global 
scale, is incapable of alleviating global imbalances 
and income differences and in recent years has on-
ly made things worse, or will it be able to develop a 
more harmonious socio-economic apparatus. Yet 
the Chinese ‘mixed economy’ or ‘market socialism’ 
has performed well so far by historical comparison 
and by international standards.
If something is worth contemplating from the 
Chinese development path it is definitely the rela-
tionship between the targets and the means. The 
backbone of Chinese economic policy is based on 
searching for pragmatic solutions embracing the 
whole of modern Chinese development, but ones 
which seek harmony in all respects (within the econ-
omy, society and links between the two).  State con-
trol and market intuition and the balance between 
the two are subordinated to this, instead of estab-
lishing their socio-economic relations after defin-
ing the ratios of the former in advance, on a ‘theo-
retical’ basis. One related lesson here is the issue of 
human rights. With its ‘single-party dictatorship’ in 
recent decades China has lifted 200 million people 
from severe poverty, and economic growth remains 
subordinate to the priorities of continuously raising 
employment; this approach has been disputed and 
criticised in many ways and by many people, but 
so far the overall results have been positive. Con-
sequently, the mouse has yet to get away…
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